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In the Matter of 
MICHAEL H. CASSIDY, 
Petitioner, 
For a Judgment Pursuant to CPLR Article 78 
-against-
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----~-----~~---------~-----------------------------------)( 
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Petitioner Michael H. Cassidy (Petitioner) seeks an order and judgment pursuant to Civil 
Practice Law & Rules Article 78 granting the following relief: (A) annulment of the Parole Board's 
June 26, 2013 Decision denying him parole; (8) his application for parole; (C) a de novo parole 
hearing; and (D) an award of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
Background and Procedural History 
Petitioner is serving an indeterminate sentence of25 years to life, after pleading guilty to the 
second degree murder of a former girlfriend in 1984, when petitioner was 24 years old. He had no 
prior violent criminal history and has been in prison for nearly thirty years. 
He first appeared before the Parole Board in 2009 and appeared again in 2011. Each time 
parole was denied. On June 25, 2013, he sat for his third parole hearing. Prior to bis hearing, on 
or about March 28, 2013, petitioner was evaluated by the COMPAS Reentry Assessment System, 
receiving favorable ratings, showing low risk for violence. re-anest, absconding, or criminal 
involvement. There was no "potential faking concern" or "inconsistent response concern" 
(Affirmation in Support, Exhibit B). 
During the hearing, petitioner was questioned extensively about the circumstances of his 1984 
offense. (Affirmation in Support, Exhibit C) I Ie was asked about allegations of deception about his 
financial circumstances and having used a credit card that did not belong to him. Petitioner 
acknowledged that he had been an angry adolescent and young man, who abused alcohol and was 
kicked out of the military for that behavior. (Exhibit C, page 4) He acknowledged having abused 
alcohol and drugs since his teens and that his thinking at the time was based in fictions he would 
never have been able to sustain. (Exhibit C, page 5) Petitioner was specifically asked whether there 
had been prior violence between him and his victim (his former girlfriend), and whether she had 
been afraid of him. He acknowledged that there had been verbal violence, and she was afraid of"the 
way [he] was ... and rightly so." (Exhibit C, pp. 5-6) He acknowledged that for the first 15 years 
of his sentence, he continued those behaviors; he had stopped such behavior, however, since 1997. 
(Exhibit C, pp. 7-8) 
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The Board noted petitioner· s efforts at rehabilitation, including substance abuse courses, 
aggression replacement training (ART), Veterans' progroms, physical education and legal research. 
(Exhibit C, page 7) Petitioner listed some of his course work and programs which had been 
completed, including network and parenting and healthy marriage classes. He acknowledged 
receiving one Tier II disciplinary ticket in 2008, but no other infractions since 1999. 
The Board questioned petitioner about his plans, ifhc were re lensed. Petitioner advised that 
he planned to reside with his father, and had secured employment at a paper manufacturing company. 
(Exhibit C, pp. 8-9) Petitioner acknowledged responsibility and expressed remorse for the crimes 
he committed. (Exhibit C at pp. 4, 7) 
The Board advised Petitioner that, although his COMP AS results were low across the board, 
particularly with those issues with which they were most concerned (future violence, risk of arrest 
and risk of absconding), they had community opposition to his release and had to consider it, as well. 
(Exhibit Cat page 9) Petitioner acknowledged that and asked whether that opposition could ever 
be overcome. I le was told that, if the only reason to keep him in was opposition, ''at some pant, that 
loses its potency" and would not be a basis to keep somebody in prison forever. (Exhibit Cat page 
11) 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Roard denied parole, and held petitioner for an 
additional 24 months, to June 2015. The Decision, a written copy of which was dated June 26, 2013, 
stated: 
After a review of the record and interview, the panel has 
determined that if released at this time, there's a reasonable 
probability that you would you would not live and remain at liberty 
without again violating the law and your release would be 
incompatible with the welfare of society and would so deprecate the 
serious nature of the crime as to undermine respect for the law. 
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This decision is based on the following factors: I.0.'s are 
is/are Murder in the 2 11d Degree, in which you beat, choked, stabbed 
and nearly eviscerated Ms. Biasi after she ended your relationship. 
Note is made of your senlencing minutes, COMPAS risk 
assessment, rehabilitative efforts. risks, needs, parole plan, 
community opposition to your release, clean disciplinary record, 
remorse, insight, positive presentation and all other required foctors. 
Your brutal and merciless oITensc occurred after your 
deceit, temper and d1inking resulted in the termination of your 
relationship. The extreme level of violence you exhibited is of grave 
concern. Parole is denied. (Exhibit Cat pp. 12-13) 
On July 2, 2013, petitioner filed an administrative notice of appeal and tiled his brief, 
perfecting the appeal on October25, 2013. (Petition at il2) No decision was rendered within the 
four-month window provided by statute. 9 NYCRR §8006.4 (a)(2) Thus, by operation of law, 
petitioner was entitled to deem his administrative remedy exhausted and seek judicial review of the 
Parole Board's July 26, 2013 determination. 9 NYCRR §8006.(c) 
This matter was commenced by Notice of Petition and Petition on or about March 26, 2014. 
Thereafter, on or about May 14, 2014, the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision 
(DOCCS) Board of Parole Counsel's Office dismissed the administrative appeal as moot due to 
litigation. (Exhibit A to Reply Aifinnation) 
Petition and Answer 
The Petition and supporting papers allege that the Parole Board's June 26, 20 I 3 decision is 
arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the law. (Petition at ~3) Spcci fically, petitioner asserts that 
the Board ignored an ·•overwhelming majority of factors" weighing in favor of his release, and 
instead issued a decision which is contradicted by the facts. impermissibly conclusory and violates 
the Executive Law. (Petition at ~34) 
He asserts that the Ooard failed to fairly and genuinely consider all of the factors as required 
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by Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) and focused solely on only one, the seriousness of the crime. In 
so doing, he alleges that the Board ignored his institutional record, program goals and 
accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational educalion, training or work assignments, 
therapy and interactions with staff and inmates. They further failed to take into considerntion his 
release plans, including the educational, training and supJX>r1 services available to him, as well as his 
lack of a prior record. (Petition at~~ 38, 45-47, 96-100) 
Petitioner further alleges that the Board's decision fails to meet the standards of Executive 
Law §259-i(2)(A) and 9 NYCRR §8002.3(d), which require that the reasons for the denial of parole 
must be stated in detail. (Petition at ~42) He asserts that the decision was wholly conclusory and 
fails to detail its reasoning, as required by the Executive Law. (Petition at ~43,103-107) TI1e·only 
explanation for the denial of parole is the "grave concern" about the seriousness of petitioner's 
offense and includes no other reasons. Petitioner asserts that this evidences the Board's failure to 
take any other factor into consideration (Petition at ~50) and that the denial was an "unlawful 
foregone conclusion." (Petition at ~56) 
Petitioner asse11s that failure to offer a detailed explanation for their conclusions is 
insufficient as a matter of Jaw. (Petition at ~ii 57-60) The omission of explanation, combined with 
the apparent disregard for the positive factors out! ined in the petition, including his "outside 
clearance" (argued for the first time in the Petition), render the decision both arbitrary and 
capricious. (Petition at~~ 67-72, l 08-113, 120) 
Petitioner asserts that the Parole Board foiled to establish and utilize written procedures in 
their parole determinations, as required by the 2011 Amendments to the Executive Lavv, despite the 
passage of more than two years since the new legislation was enacted. (Petition at~~ 73-76, 114-
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117) He argues that the October 5, 2011 internal memorandum of former Chair Andrea Evans 
(Supporting Affirmation, Exhibit E) acknowledged the Board's delay in establishing written 
criteria and, moreover, incorrectly advised Parole Board personnel that the amendments did not 
change any criteria for the review and granting of parole. (Petition at 178) Not until December 2, 
2013, almost six month after petitioner's hearing. were the requisite rules finally filed. (Petition at 
,87, Supporting Affirmation at 17, and Exhibit F) Petitioner posits that the lack of procedural mies 
meant that the Board failed to take into consideration the available COMPAS Risk Assessment. 
(Petition at 189). 
Finally, petitioner argues that the amendments to Correction Law §71-a, effective October 
L, 20 I I, required the development of a Transitional Accountability Plan (TAP) to provide additional 
information about risks and needs principles. (Petition at §90) Although TAPs were developed 
before Petitioner's hearing date, no such instrument was prepared or utilized in his hearing, thus 
rendering the decision contrary to the requirements of law. (Petition at §§ 90-92, 122-124) 
Petitioner avers that these failures deprived him of his due process rights under the 
Constitutions of New York and the United States. (Petition at ~jl 26) 
In its Answer, respondent appears to argue that petitioner had not yet exhausted his 
administrative appeal (Answer and Return at ~3 ); however, that argument has been rendered moot 
by the subsequent action of the Parole Board, as aforesaid. 
In all other respects, respondent argues that petitioner's claims are without merit. The Board 
is entitled to exercise its independent judgment in weighing any statutory factor in making its 
determination. In so doing, the Board may place greater weight on an inmate's criminal conduct 
than upon his institutional adjustment and release plans; and a denial based on the determination that 
6 
the inmate's achievements are outweighed by the severity of his crimes is within tht: Board's 
discretion. (Answer and Return at ~5) 
Nor is the Board required to articulate the weight accorded to each factor. The Board is 
required to and, in the instant matter, did consider the COMPAS assessment, but may place 
whatever weight it deems appropriate on that information. (Answer and Return at ~7) The Board 
may further exercise complete discretion in controlling the nature and scope of the subject matter of 
the interview; no due process right attaches to such interview. (Answer and Return at ~8) 
In the instant matter, respondent asserts that the record reveals that the Board considered all 
the required factors and supported its determination that the extremely serious nature of the offense 
was incompatible with the welfare of society and revealed a reasonable probability that petitioner 
would re-offend. If the Board demonstrates that it has weighed the statutory factors involved in 
release determinations, its decision may not b\! disturbed. (Answer and Return at ~9) I Iere, the 
respondent continues, the record shows tlrnl petitioner's COMP AS score was considered, including 
his favorable low risk scores; as was his sentencing minutes, institutional record, clean disciplinary 
record and programming. Hence, there is no evidence of pre-determination. (Answer csnd Return 
Respondent asserts that the Memorandum of former Chair Evans established the writlen 
procedures required for the use of risk and needs assessment and that the same was fol lowed by 
Petitioner's Board, particularly including the use of the COMP AS assessment. (Answer and Return 
at 1~ 12-13) Finally, respondent notes that this petitioner was not entitled to a TAP as the 
amendment to Correction Law §7 1-a requiring the promulgation of a TAP applies only to prisoners 
coming into custody on or after September 30, 201 I. Thus, the Board's determination sufficiently 
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complied with the written procedures requirement of Executive Law §259-c( 4). 
Discussion 
Standards for Review: 
It has become fundamental that release on parole is a discretionary function of the Parole 
Board. Provided that the determination of the Board follows statutory standards for such decisions, 
it will not be disturbed by a court, absent a showing that the decision is "irrational bordering on 
impropriety" and, thus, arbitrary and capricious. Maller of Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY 2d 470 (2000); 
Maller of King v. NYS Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423 (1 $( Dep't 1993)> affd, 83 NY 2d 788 (1994); 
Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 AD3d 105 (1'1 Dep't 2008) 
Executive Law §259-i(c)(A) provides that discretionary release on parole shall not be granted 
merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined, but rather 
after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare 
of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of the crime as to undermine respect for the law. 
Matter of King, supra, 190 AD2d at 430 
The Parole Board is required to consider a number of factors in determining whether an 
inmate should be released. Executive Law §259-i requires the court to consider factors including, 
but not limited.to, the institutional record (including program goals and accomplishments, vocational 
education, academic achievements, etc); release plans, including commllnity resources, employment, 
education and training and available support services; any deportation order issued; the seriollsness 
of the offense, with due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and 
recommendations of the sentencing court, the attomey and the pre-sentence probation report, and the 
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prior criminal record. Maller of Malone v. Evans, 83 AD3d 719 (2"J Dep't 2011 ); Siao-Pao v. 
Dennison, supra, 5 I AD2d at 106 
The Parole Board's decision need not specifically refer to each and every factor nor must it 
give each factor equal weight. Maller of King, supra, I 90 AD2d at 43 1 The weight to be accorded 
to each statutory factor lies solely within the discretion of the Board. Siao-Pao v. Dennison, supra, 
51 AD3d at 108 However, it is incumbent on the Board to actually consider each applicable 
statutory factor and. "where the record convincingly demonstrates that the board did in fact fail to 
consider the proper standards, the courts must intervene." Mafler of'King, su1wa, 190 AD2d at 431 
Executive Law §259-cl 41 requires the Board to incorporate risk and needs principles to 
measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the Board and the likelihood of success of 
such persons upon release. The 2011 Amendments to the Executive r .aw mandated the Parole Board 
to adopt procedures to assist members in determining which inmates may be released to parole 
supervision. Mafler ofTlnvaites v. NYS Board of Parole, 34 Misc. 3d 694 (2011) 
Where the Board's dete1mination includes consideration of nil relevant statutory factors, 
including the criminal history, the instant offense, the [lack otl disciplinary infractions since the last 
appearance, program and educational accomplishments and post-release plans, further judicial review 
is precluded. Matier ofBorcsok v. NYS Division <~{Parole, 34 AD3d 961 (3rd Dep't 2006) 
Conversely, however, when the Board denies parole, it is required to inform the inmate in 
writing of the factors and reasons for the denial. and "[s]uch reasons shall be given in detail and not 
in conclusory terms." Executive Law §259-i[2][ a]; Matter of Mitchell v. NYS D;vision of Parole, 58 
AD3d 742 (2'1d Dep't 2009) A detailed written explanation is necessary to enable intelligent 
judicial review of the Board's decision. Matter <~{West v. NYS Board of Parole, 4 I Misc. 3d 
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1214(A) (2013) The absence of such a detailed decision inappropriately forecloses the possibility 
of intelligent review. Mayfield v. Evans, 93 AD3d 98, 100 (I 51 Dcp't 2010) The decision to deny 
parole cannot be based solely on the nature of lhe underlying offense. Winchell v. Evans, 27 Misc. 
3d l 232(A) (20 l 0), citing Wallman v. Ji·avis, 18 AD 3d 304, 307-08 ( 15' Dcp't 2005) 
A Parole Board's denial of parole which focused almost exclusively on the inmate's crime, 
while failing to take into account and fairly consider any of the other relevant statutory factors which 
categorically supported inmate's release, wus arbilrnry and capricious. Similarly, the Board's failure 
to explain, other than the facts of the crime, why the inmate's release was incompatible with public 
safety and welfare, could not be supported. Mcttter of Morris v. NYS Dep 't of Corrections and 
Community Supervision, 40 Misc. 3d 226(2013) 
In the instant matter, the Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that the Board's hearing 
focused exclusively on peti tioner's crime. In the hearing, the I3oard raised the issue of community 
opposition to petitioner's release and placed considerable colloquy on the record in response to 
petitioner's question about the '.Veight to be accorded to such opposition. 1 Nor can the Court find 
that the Board ignored the COMPAS assessment in the interview, noting, as it did, the positive 
results it considered. 
However, the decision of the Board is another matter. Although the serious nature of the 
crime remains "acutely relevant"' in determining whether petitioner should be released, the Board 
must still lake into account and fairly consider the other relevant statutory factors. Malter of West, 
supra, 41 Misc. 3d at 1214(A) In its decision, the Board's only clear focus was on the subject 
'Petitioner acknowl1.:tlges this "negative•· factor, but asserts that the Board's failure to 
discuss it in the Decision implies it was not substantially considered by it. Th is Court has no 
way to assess that argument. 
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conviction, thus supporting the premise that the decision was pre·determined. 
Such focus is corroborated by the "boilerplate" decision, which contains the statutory 
language and the "terse, conclusory sentences" that "[y]our institutional accomplishments and release 
plans arc noted. Required statutory factors have been considered." Id. 
In Matter of Thwaites. supra, the Board's decision stated: 
After a careful review of your record, a personal 
interview, and deliberation, parole is denied. Your institutional 
accomplishments and release plans are noted, as is your improved 
disciplinary record. This panel remains concerned, however, about your 
history of unlawful conduct, the gracity (sic) of your instant offense and the 
disregard displayed for the norms of our society, when considered with the 
required relevant factors leads to the conclusion that your discretionary 
release is inappropriate at this lime and incompatible with the welfare of 
the community and would so deprecate the seriousness of your crime as to 
undermine respect for the law. (Emphasis added) 
Upon review, the Court found that this language, although referencing the "positive" 
factors, relied almost exclusively on the nature of petitioner's crime. 34 Misc. Jd at 700 
In the instant matter, while the petitioner's accomplishments and release plans were noted, the 
decision focused on the circumstances of the crime committed nearly 25 years earlier. Id. 
Reasoning rhat employs past-centered rhetoric and not future-focused risk assessment 
analysis is inconsistent with the rational determination of the inquiry at hand, to wit: whether the 
inmate can live and remain at liberty without violating the law and whether his release was 
incompatible with the welfare of society and did not deprecate the seriousness of his crime so as to 
undermine respect for the law. Id., citing Executive Law §259-i[2J[c] 
The Court in Matter ofThwaites found the Board's decision to be arbitrary and capricious, 
irrational and improper based on the Board's failure to articulate any rational, non-conclusory basis, 
other than its reliance on the seriousness of the crime, why the Board could not believe there was a 
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reasonable probability that the petitioner could live and remain at liberty without violating the law, 
and that his release was incompatible with the welfare of society and did not deprecate the 
seriousness of his crime so as to undermine respect for the law. Id. at 701 
Similarly, in Matter ofMorris, supra, the Court found that a "passing mention" of petitioner's 
accomplislunents and document submissions, and conclusory statements that statutory factors were 
considered, were "woefully inadequate" to demonstrate that the Board weighed or fairly considered 
the required statutory factors. 40 Misc. 3d at 234; Matter o_f West, supra, 12 I 4(A) 
Although the Board need not specify each statutory factor in its decision, it must do "more 
than merely mouth" those criteria, pa11icularly where, as here, factors recited in the interview, other 
than the crime itself, militated heavily in favor of release. Weinstein v. Dennison, 7 Misc. 3d 
I 009(A) (2005) The Parole Board's determination must be sufficiently detailed to apprise petitioner 
of the reasons for the denial of his parole. Matter o,(Stokes v. Stan.ford, 2014 NY Slip Op. 50899(U) 
(June 9, 2014), citing, Malter c?{Dovis v. Travis, 292° J\D2d 742 (3'u Dep't 2002) 
In this matter, the Board's decision appears to have accorded no weight to any factor apa11 
from the seriousness of petitioner's offense. See, Winchell v. Evans, supra, 27 Misc. 3d l 232(A} 
for respondents to have simply restated the usual and predictable language contained in so many 
parole release decisions with no speci licity or other explanation to justify parole denial is 
tmacceptable. Bruetsch v. NYS Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, 43 Misc. 
3d 1223(A) (5/11/2014) To simply defer to its co.nclusion leaves the reviewing court to guess at the 
basis for the Board's denial. Vaello v. Parole Board Div. o.fthe State ofNew York, 48 /\D3d 1018, 
109 (3'd Dep't 2008); Perfetto v. Evans, 112 AD3d 640 (2"d Dep't 2013) 
Additionally, this Court is not persuaded by respondent's arguments that the Evans 
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memorandum (Supporting Atlfrmation, Exhibit E) constituted sufficient compliance with the 
statutory mandate to promulgate new procedures in making parole release determinations. The 2011 
amendments "replaced static, past-focused 'guidelines' with more dynamic present and future-
focused risk assessment procedures." Maller of Thwaites, supra, 34 Misc. 3d at 699 
The Court is troubled in particular by the assertion in the Evans memorandum that the 
standards for assessing parole determinations had not changed. The Legislature, in enacting an 
amendment ofa statute, changing the language thereof, is deemed to have intended a material change 
in the law. Morris v. New York Stale Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, 40 
Misc. 3d 226(2013), quoting, Matter o_f'Stein, l 31 AD2d 68, 7 J (2"d Dep't 1987) The assertion in 
the memorandum that the amendment maintained the status quo must be rejected. Id. at 229 
Rather, the amended statute required respondent lo develop written procedures that implement risk 
and needs principles, delenninc the likelihood of an inmate's success upon release, and adopt those 
procedures as an exercise of its rule making power. Id. at 230 
In the instant matter, respondent, like the respondent in Morris, continues to nrgue that the 
Evans memorandum serve[d) as the establishment of the required procedures, despite the fact that 
it had neither been adople<l as a formal rule, nor filed with the Secretary of State, as required by 
Executive Law §259-c(11).2 Like the Cou11 in Morr fa·, this Court rejects that assertion and finds that 
the Evans memorandum is nut and cannot serve as the required procedure, Id. at232, an assertion 
supported by the subsequent filing of proposed rule changes in December 2011. 
2The Com1 recognizes respondent's reliance on Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197 (31<1 
Dep 't 2014) in so doing; but notes further that few other courts have followed this ruling, now 
subject lo review by the Court of Appeals. 23 NY 3d 903 (May 13. 2014) 
13 
Disregard of a legislative mandate through an administrative agency's inaction, as occurred 
in Morris and in the case at bar, is arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law. Id., citing, inter a/ia, 
Mayfield v. Evans, 93 AD3d 98, I 07 (l '1 Dep't 2012) By reason thereof, the June 25, 2013 parole 
hearing was unlawful. Id. 
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court concludes that petitioner has adequately established 
his contention that the Parole Board's determination was arbitrary and capricious, irrational and 
improper. 
Having so determined, the Court need not reach any of the other arguments advanced by 
petitioner. 
The June 26, 2013 decision of the Board of Parole is hereby vacated, and this matter is 
remanded to the Board of Parole. Within 30 days of the date of the service of a copy of this Order, 
with notice of entry. petitioner shall be entitled to a new parole hearing consistent with this decision 
and the mandates of Executive Law §§259-c and 259-i. The new hearing shall be held before a 
different panel of the Parole Board. 
This decision shall constitute the order of the Court. 
Dated: July 18, 2014 
Goshen, New York 
To: Carter, Ledyard & Milburn, LLP 
2 Wall Street 
New York, NY 10005 
Jeane L. Strickland Smith 
Office of the New York State Attorney General 
One Civic Center Plaza, Suite 401 
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601 
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